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I.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
This is a permissive appeal filed by Phillip and Marcia Eldridge ("Eldridges") in a

medical malpractice action that they brought against Gregory West, M.D. ("Dr. West"), Lance
Turpin, PA ("PA Turpin"), and Summit Orthopaedics Specialists, PLLC ("Summit")
(collectively, "West defendants"). The Eldridges assert that the district court (1) erred in
dismissing their claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, gross
negligence, and reckless, willful, and wanton conduct; (2) erred in denying their motions to
strike the Affidavit of Lance Turpin, PA, and the First Affidavit of Gregory West, M.D.;
(3) erred in limiting the Eldridges' alleged damages to medical care between December 20, 2012,
and April 24, 2013; and (4) erred in concluding that the Eldridges could present only the paid
amount of medical expenses rather than the billed amount.

B.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Introduction to statement of facts.

Mr. Eldridge's medical history was complicated. In 2009, Dr. West took him to surgery
for a hip replacement in his right hip ("first hip"), performed exploratory surgery on the first hip
in October 2012, took Mr. Eldridge to surgery to treat a MRSA infection in the first hip in
December 2012, and ultimately perfotmed surgery in March 2013 to explant the first hip. The
MRSA infection cleared, and in October 2013, Aaron Altenburg, M.D. ("Dr. Altenburg"),
perfmmed a second hip replacement for Mr. Eldridge ("second hip"). The second hip became
infected in February 2014. In June 2015, Mr. ElclTidge had the second hip explanted and in
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February 2016, he had a third hip replacement ("third hip") at the University of Utah.
Mr. Eldridge still has his third hip prosthesis.

2.

Treatment of Mr. Eldridge's first hip between 2009 and April 2013.

In 2009, Dr. West replaced Mr. Eldridge's right hip with a hip prosthesis (the first hip).
R. Supp., p. 78, ,r 7, p. 99. In August 2011 he fell into the bathtub and could not get out. R.
Supp., pp. 283-85. He began having pain in the first hip in the fall of that year. In April 2012 a
surgery was done to loosen the psoas tendon in his right leg to help alleviate the pain. R. Supp.,
p. 286. Aspirations of the first hip in May and June 2012 produced no growth when cultured. R.
Supp., p. 79. A CT scan showed no loose components. Id. Similarly, repeat cultures on
October 16 and 22, 2012, produced no bacterial growth. R. Supp., p. 80. As a precaution,
however, he was put on antibiotics. Id. On October 29, 2012, Dr. West performed an
exploratory surgery, with the goal of replacing the first hip components if an infection was
found. R. Supp., pp. 81-82. However, frozen sections done during surgery confirmed what the
previous aspirations had found~no infection. R. Supp., p. 82. As such, the first hip was not
removed, but the metal ball of the acetabular component was replaced with a ceramic ball. Id.
Following his revision surgery of the first hip on October 29, 2012, Mr. Eldridge was
instructed not to bend his hip to more than a 70 degree angle. Despite these instructions, on
November 4, 2012, Mr. Eldridge attempted to shower in the tub and dislocated his first hip. R.
Supp., p. 291. The first hip continued to dislocate on several occasions prior to a revision
surgery that Dr. West performed on December 3, 2012. On December 18, 2012, Mr. Eldridge
presented to the hospital with an altered mental status, and was diagnosed with a MRSA
infection in the first hip. When Dr. West perf01med surgery on December 19, 2012, he
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discovered a large hematoma. R. Supp., p. 85. The superficial portion of the hematoma
appeared to be infected, while the deeper area was n01mal. Because it was near, but not in, the
hip joint, Mr. Eldridge was treated with irrigation and debridement, antibiotic beads and
IV antibiotics, which literature suggested was likely to be 80-85% successful. R. Supp., pp. 8586.
Unfortunately, treatment with i11'igation and debridement surgeries and antibiotics could
not resolve the MRSA infection, and on March 2, 2013, Dr. West recommended a full explant of
the first hip. R. Supp., pp. 89, 268. Mr. Eldridge wished to delay any explant. Id. However,
when the C-reactive protein and sedimentation rates climbed on March 11, 2013, indicating the
infection was not resolving, Dr. West again recommended an explant, which was done on
March 13, 2013. Id. The explant required additional surgery time because the hip was "really in
there," and they had to split the bone to take it out. R. Supp., p. 268. Eventually the antibiotic
spacer and all other metal components needed to be removed and were removed on April 24,
2013. R. Supp., pp. 91-92, ,i 62.

3.

The MRSA infection clears, so Dr. Altenburg implants the second hip in
October 2013; however, the second hip becomes infected in 2014, is explanted
in 2015, and a third hip is implanted in 2016 at the University of Utah.

Following lengthy treatment with antibiotics, Dr. Altenburg cleared Mr. Eldridge to
receive the second hip in October 2013. R., p. 678. A MRSA screening prior to surgery was
negative. R., p. 675. Following the second hip implant, Mr. Eldridge stopped IV antibiotics in
October 2013, against medical advice.
In February 2014, Mr. Eldridge was diagnosed with a MRSA infection in his second hip.
On June 25, 2015, Mr. Eldridge presented to the University of Utah and had the second hip that
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Dr. Altenberg placed removed. R., p. 912. On February 23, 2016, Mr. Eldridge had a third hip
prosthesis placed at the University of Utah. Id.

C.

Course of Proceedings.

1.

The Eldridges allege claims for medical malpractice, negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, recklessness, gross negligence,
informed consent, and loss of consortium.

The Eldridges brought this action in October 2013 alleging that the West defendants
breached their applicable standards of care when treating Mr. Eldridge's first hip that Dr. West
implanted in 2009. The Eldridges alleged claims for medical malpractice, loss of consortium,
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and gross negligence, recklessness or
willful and wanton conduct. R., pp. 35-52. They later amended their complaint in August 2015
to include a claim for lack of informed consent. R., pp. 353-70. The Eldridges' allegations
included the entire course of treatment by Dr. West and PA Turpin from October 2011 to June
2013, without nairnwing the allegations to any particular breach of the standard of care. R.,
pp. 36-43, 45, ~ 47 ("More specifically, [Respondents] failed to properly follow the standard of
care in operating, replacing, or otherwise treating Mr. Eldridge's right hip .... ").

2.

The district court dismisses the Eldridges' claims for negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, recldessness, and gross negligence
on the basis that they are preempted by Idaho Code Sections 6-1012 and
6-1013.

On March 5, 2014, after filing their answer, the West defendants joined in their
co-defendants' partial motion to dismiss the common law claims on the ground that those claims
were preempted by the Idaho Medical Malpractice Act. R., p. 94. On April 3, 2014, the district
court granted the motion, holding:
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Idaho Code § 6-1012 applies whenever the claim results from the
provision or failure to provide health care. Because the Verified
Complaint alleges Mr. Eldridge's injuries occunsed as a result of
Defendants' provision of or failure to provide medical care, Idaho
Code§ 6-1012 applies. Plaintiffs['] second, third and fourth
causes of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress;
intentional infliction of emotional distress; and gross negligence,
reckless, willful and wanton conduct are subsumed in the first
cause of action for medical negligence.

R.,p. 103.

3.

The district court grants PA Turpin's summary judgment motion, but denies
Dr. West's first and second summary judgment motions, and denies the
Eldridges' motion to strike the affidavits filed by PA Turpin and Dr. West.

Following discovery, the West defendants moved for summary judgment on
September 18, 2014, arguing that
[t]his summary judgment motion is based upon the Plaintiffs'
failure to produce admissible evidence showing that Dr. West or
PA Turpin breached the standard of care. Because the Plaintiffs
have not provided evidence on which a reasonable jury could find
each of the required elements of their cause of action, summary
judgment is appropriate.
R., p. 117. This motion was not heard until after a second motion for summary judgment was
filed on May I, 2015. R., pp. 153-55. The West defendants suppmied both motions with an
affidavit from PA Turpin and an affidavit from Dr. West ("Dr. West's first affidavit"). R.,
pp. 130-31, 135-36, 153-55. Both affidavits asserted that the practitioner was familiar with the
standard of care based on the 11 or 20 years they had practiced in the relevant community. R.,
pp. 130-31, ,r,r 2-3, p. 135, ,r,r 2-3. Both asserted that all the care they had provided to
Mr. Eldridge was consistent with the standard of care. R., p. 131, ii 4, p. 135, ,r 4.
The Eldridges' response to these motions in May 2015 included a detailed ten-page
account of the care Dr. West and PA Turpin provided, which was also supported by the affidavit
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of their expe1i, Mauro Giordani, M.D. ("Dr. Giordani"). R., pp. 158-69, 173-74, 180-85. For the
first time in the litigation, the Eldridges alleged specific breaches of the standard of care. R.,
pp. 158-69, 173-74. The Eldridges also moved to strike paragraphs 3-6 of Dr. West's first
affidavit and PA Turpin's affidavit. R., pp. 215-23. The hearing on summary judgment was
continued until the motions to strike were heard. R., p. 300. On July 13, 2015, the district court
denied the Eldridges' motion to strike the affidavits, finding that Dr. West's and PA Turpin's
years of practice in the relevant community were a sufficient basis under Mattox v. Life Care
Centers ofAmerica, Inc., 157 Idaho 468,474,337 P.3d 627,633 (2014), to demonstrate
knowledge of the standard of care, and that their statements regarding the standard of care
complied with Foster v. Traul, 141 Idaho 890, 120 P.3d 278 (2005). R., pp. 310-11. The district
court struck portions of Dr. Giordani' s affidavit, finding that there was no foundation for his
knowledge of the Idaho Falls standard of care. Id.
The Eldridges filed a motion for reconsideration of those decisions, along with a new
declaration from Dr. Giordani, which was considered with the pending motions for summary
judgment. R., pp. 318-39. The West defendants opposed the motions. R., pp. 425-30, 441-52.
On September 11, 2015, the district court affirmed its decision that Dr. West's first affidavit and
PA Turpin's affidavit were admissible. R., pp. 473-76. The district court also affirmed that
Dr. Giordani still did not have any foundation for opinions regarding the standard of care
applicable to PA Turpin, because the physician with whom Dr. Giordani consulted did not
practice in Idaho Falls and "did not observe, read about or consult with anyone familiar with
Idaho Falls standards of care applicable to mihopedic physician assistants .... " R., p. 482. It
reconsidered its decision with regard to Dr. Giordani's statements regarding Dr. West, finding
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that Dr. Giordani's declaration was admissible because their Blackfoot expe1i had spoken with
Dr. West regarding the standard of care for Idaho Falls. R., p. 483. It then granted summary
judgment for PA Turpin, holding Plaintiffs "[have J not put in issue any facts that would create a
genuine issue as to Mr. Turpin's breach of the standard of care." R., p. 486. It denied summary
judgment to Dr. ,West at that time. R., p. 488.
4.

1

The district court grants part of Dr. West's third summary judgment motion
as to the Eldridges' claim that the October 29, 2012, surgery on the first hip
breached the standard of care and their informed consent claim, but denies
summary judgment to Dr. West regarding the Eldridges' claim that Dr. West
breached the standard of care regarding his treatment of the MRSA.

On April 18, 2016, Dr. West filed a third motion for summary judgment, including a
second affidavit setting fmih the care that he provided and attaching the relevant medical records
to that affidavit as Exhibits A-0. R. Supp., pp. 76-138. In response, on May 23, 2016,
Dr. Giordani filed a second declaration. Aug., pp. 1-115. On June 10, 2016, Dr. West filed a
third affidavit, addressing additional issues and attaching more medical records. R., pp. 534-48.
The Eldridges again challenged the adequacy of both affidavits. R., pp. 549-54, 574-79. The
district comi excluded Dr. Giordani's testimony that the hip was infected on October 29, 2012,
smce
there is no admissible evidence in the present record that Eldridge
more probably than not in fact had an infected hip on October 29,
2012 (as opposed to "a chance"), [and therefore] Dr. Giordani's
opinion that Dr. West breached the Idaho Falls standard of care by
not fully explanting an infected hip during surgery on October 29th
is not admissible on summary judgment.
1

The order granting PA Turpin's Motion for Summary Judgment was entered on October 13,
2015. R., pp. 493-95. Neither that order nor the memorandum decision of September 11, 2015,
was included in Appellants' Amended Notice of Appeal. The Eldridges did appeal the denial of
Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Reconsideration on Febrnary 22, 2017.
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R., p. 585. The district court then granted summary judgment to Dr. West on the info1med
consent and malpractice claim related to the October 29, 2012, surgery on the first hip. R.,
pp. 593-95. The Eldridges have not challenged these rulings. The district court denied
Dr. West's motion for summary judgment on the claims regarding treatment for MRSA, finding
Dr. Giordani had a "weak" foundation for his testimony regarding the standard of care, but based
on Dr. Giordani's May 23, 2016, declaration, a jury could find "surgeries from December 3rd to
March 13th likely would have been avoided." R., p. 596.

5.

The district court grants part of Dr. West's fourth summary judgment
motion and limits the Eldridges' alleged damages to medical expenses
between December 20, 2012, and April 24, 2013.

Following the district comt's rulings on Dr. West's third summary judgment motion, the
only remaining claim was that Dr. West breached the standard of care by failing to explant the
hip as soon as MRSA was diagnosed on December 20, 2012. R., pp. 595-96. On November 29,
2016, Dr. West moved for summary judgment a fourth time, arguing that based on the prior
ruling there was no admissible testimony that using conservative treatment before an explant
caused Mr. Eldridge's damages, or alternatively to exclude any damages after the explant was
performed on March 13, 2013. R., pp. 600-01. The primary basis was that Dr. Giordani's expert
repmt only included a review of Mr. Eldridge's medical records up to April 24, 2013. R., p. 202.
Dr. Giordani' s May 23, 2016, declaration was the only one to offer an opinion about the
treatment for MRSA, and stated only vaguely that "[h]ad Dr. West performed the full explant
when he found that Mr. Eldridge had MRSA, it is more probable than not that Mr. Eldridge
would not have needed the subsequent surgeries and then potential re-implantation of a new
hip," Aug., p. 16, 1 32 (emphasis added), even though the second hip had already been implanted
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in October 2013 by Dr. Altenburg. At the hearing, the Eldridges conceded that Dr. Giordani had
not reviewed medical records after April 24, 2013, but argued Dr. Giordani could still offer
opinions that any later care was related to the alleged delay to explant the first hip in December
2012. Tr., 162:23 - 163:10. After briefing and a hearing, the district court granted Dr. West's
fourth summary judgment motion, in pati, limiting damages to between December 20, 2012, and
April 24, 2013, holding:
[I]n order for [Dr. Giordani] to form an opinion as to surgeries of
Mr. Eldridge, he at least has to know something about those
surgeries in terms of when they occurred (lfld what was done,
et cetera, et cetera. He needs an awful lot of information about
what the tests for MRSA disclosed. And as near as I can tell in my
review of the record in this case, including the report and
declarations and affidavits of Dr. Giordani, he really never even
looked at any medical records after April 24th, 2013, dealing with
Mr. Eldridge. So therefore, the Court doesn't think he has enough
foundation to give an opinion as to whether or not there was
necessary or unnecessary surgery after that date.
Tr., 168:21 - 169:6 (emphasis added). In addition, the district court held "the disclosure under
Rule 26(b)(4)(A) does not appear to be adequate for any -- relating to any surgeries after
April 24th, 2013" and therefore is not admissible. Tr., 169:6-9. Because Dr. Giordani had not
disclosed testimony, and had no foundation for his testimony regarding further damages, the
district court stated:
There's no evidence that -to rebut Dr. West's opinion that he
cleared up the MRSA and that the hip was reimplanted in October
of 2013 by Dr. Altenburg and that whatever MRSA' s [sic J they
had thereafter were different MRSA's [sic]. So basically, there's
110 genuine issue offact to support (my causation of damages
after April 24th, 2013. So to that extent the motion is granted.
Tr., 169:19-24 (emphasis added).
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6.

The district court grants Dr. West's motion in limine to admit only evidence
of the amount that Medicare paid for Mr. Eldridge's medical care, not the
billed amount.

Finally, the district court granted Dr. West's motion in limine to admit only evidence of
the medical expenses that the Eldridges actually incurred, i.e., what was paid by Medicare, rather
than the amounts billed prior to the application of Medicare write-offs. Tr., 178:12 - 179:13.
The Eldridges then sought a permissive appeal that was accepted by the Court.

II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

Respondents request attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code
Section 12-121 and Rules 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.

III.
A.

ARGUMENT

The District Court Correctly Determined that the Eldridges' Common Law Claims
of Negligent and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Recklessness, and
Gross Negligence Were Preempted by the Idaho Medical Malpractice Act.
The district court properly held that Idaho Code Section 6-1012 has preempted claims for

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, gross negligence, recklessness or
willful and wanton conduct arising out of the provision of medical care. First, it is important to
recognize that the Idaho Medical Malpractice Act was passed in 1976 in order to stabilize or
decrease the cost of medical malpractice insurance. The chosen method was to limit liability by
requiring proof of a deviation from a community standard of care.

It is the declaration of the legislature that appropriate measures are
required in the public interest to assure that a liability insurance
market be available to physicians, hospitals and other health care
providers in this state and that the same be available at reasonable
cost, thus assuring the availability of such health care providers for
the provision of care to persons in the state. It is, therefore,
further declared to be in the public interest that the liability
exposure of such health care providers be limited and made more
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definable by a requirement for direct proof of departure from a
community standard of practice.
Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 184, 219 P.3d 1192, 1200 (2009)(quoting 1976 Sess. Laws
ch. 277, § I) (emphasis added) (approving trial court's refusal to allow negligence per se claim).
The purpose of the bill was to limit liability exposure for health care providers, while still
providing a remedy to patients injured by malpractice. Interpreting the Medical Malpractice Act
to allow just one cause of action is consistent with the statutory language and the intent of the
legislature to limit liability.
The plain language of Section 6-1012 establishes just one standard of care applicable to
all claims related to medical treatment. "In any case, claim or action for damages due to
injury ... against any physician ... on account of the provision of or failure to provide health
care or 011 account of any matter incidental or related thereto, such ... plaintiff must ...
affirmatively prove by direct expert testimony ... that such defendant then and there negligently
failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice of the community .... "
LC.§ 6-1012 (emphasis added). The very broad language of the statute clearly demonstrates the
legislature's intent that the Medical Malpractice Act would occupy the field for all claims
"incidental or related to" the provision of health care. This Court has consistently rejected other
theories ofrecovery under the common law. See Conner v. Hodges, 157 Idaho 19, 25-26, 333
P.3d 130, 136-37 (2014) (breach of contract); Hoover v. Hunter, 150 Idaho 658,663,249 P.3d
851, 856 (2011) (fraud); Schmechel, 148 Idaho at 183, 219 P.3d at 1199 (negligence per se);
Hough v. F1y, 131 Idaho 230,233,953 P.2d 980,983 (1998) ("ordinary negligence"); Kolln v.
St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323,334,940 P.2d 1142, 1153 (1997) (res ipsa loquitur).
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In Litz v. Robinson, 131 Idaho 282,284,955 P.2d 113, 115 (Ct. App. 1997), the plaintiff
argued that Section 6-1012 did not apply because his claim was brought as intentional infliction
of emotional distress. The Idaho Court of Appeals rejected this argument because the
"underlying nature of [the] claim ... was inextricably intertwined with a claim of negligence."
The Eldridges have not brought any claims that do not relate to the provision of health care. R.,
pp. 35-53. The "special relationship" alleged as the basis of the negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims, for example, is that of physician-patient. R., p. 35, ,r,r 57,
64. As such, regardless of how the claims are denominated, the same standard of care applies,
and only one cause of action is authorized or necessary under Section 6-1012.
Because the same minimum standard of care and burden of proof applies to all claims
incidental to the provision of medical care, there is no need for multiple claims that serve merely
to complicate the case and confuse the jury. There is no dispute that under Idaho law, a plaintiff
is entitled to recover general or noneconomic damages for emotional distress should he prove
that his physician breached the standard of care. See Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho
14, 20, 539 P.2d 566,572 (1975) (including emotional dish·ess in enumeration of general
damages); I.C. § 6-1601(5) (including emotional distress and mental anguish in list of
noneconomic damages). There is no need for a separate cause of action for either negligent or
intentional infliction of emotional distress, particularly where the plaintiff must still meet the
same threshold-proving a breach of the local standard of care.
Reckless or willful conduct only become relevant if the plaintiff meets his burden of
proof with regard to negligence, and then only to determine whether the noneconomic damages
cap would apply. Carillo v. Boise Tire Co., 152 Idaho 741,751,274 P.3d 1256, 1266 (2012).

- 12 07823.0003.11254876. I

Thus, there is no need for a "claim" of gross negligence, reckless, willful and wanton conduct.
The Idaho Legislature's statutory cause of action under Sections 6-1012 and 6-1013 is sufficient.
Futther, the Eldridges have produced no ldaho case law demonstrating that gross
negligence, reckless, willful and wanton conduct is actually a valid independent cause of action
under Idaho law. Instead, the authority that the Eldridges rely upon shows that all of these are
degrees or types of negligence claims. See Jones v. Cra11forth, 147 Idaho 11, 17, 205 P.3d 660,
666 (2009) (approving expe1t testimony "as to what conduct they would characterize as reaching
a level of negligence that they saw as reckless" although no "claim" for recklessness was made);

Schmechel, 148 Idaho at 187, 219 P.3d at 1203 (holding that "negligence is the equivalent of a
'lesser-included offense' to reckless conduct," and that refusal to instruct on recklessness before
the jury returned a verdict in excess of the noneconomic damages cap was not error). If a
plaintiff can show reckless or willful conduct, then the noneconomic damages cap does not
apply. I.C. § 6-1603. But no separate cause of action is necessary, and gross negligence does
not meet that burden of proof. As such, the district court did not err in dismissing these claims.

B.

The District Court's Decision to Admit PA Turpin's Affidavit Is Moot; Even iflt Is
Not Moot, the District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting
PA Turpin's Affidavit.
1.

The district court's decision to admit PA Turpin's affidavit is moot because
the Eldridges are not challenging the decision granting PA Turpin summary
judgment.

The Eldridges have challenged only the sufficiency of PA Turpin's affidavit under
Rule 56(c) and argue only that he was given an improper inference under Rule 56. They have not
challenged or provided any argument asking this Coutt to reverse the district coutt's decision
granting PA Turpin summary judgment. Appellant's Br. at 15, referencing R., pp. 130-31, 135-
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36. The Eldridges, therefore, have waived any challenge to the district court's decision granting
PA Turpin summary judgment. See Wheeler v. Idaho Dep't a/Health & Welfare, 147 Idaho 257,
266, 207 P.3d 988, 997 (2009) ("This Court has held that issues on appeal that are not supported
by propositions of law or authority are deemed waived and will not be considered."). Having
waived any challenge to the grant of summary judgment for PA Turpin, the issue as to the
admissibility of his affidavit is moot because any judicial review will have no effect as to the
outcome of the appeal. In essence, the Eldridges are asking this Comi to render an opinion on an
issue that is moot or has nothing to do with PA Turpin being dismissed from this case. As such,
any appellate review is purely advisory. This Court does not provide advisory opinions. State v.

Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 9,232 P.3d 327,330 (2010) ("In effect, the State is asking this Court to
issue an advisory opinion in order to avoid the issue in future cases; an exercise this Court will
not undertake.").

2.

Even if the admissibility of PA Turpin's affidavit is not moot, the decision to
admit his affidavit was not an abuse discretion.

A trial comi exercises its discretion in order to detennine what evidence is admissible in
connection with a motion for summary judgment. Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 115,
254 P.3d 11, 16 (2011); Jones, 147 Idaho at 17, 205 P.3d at 666. The admissibility of expert
testimony is an issue that is separate from whether such testimony is sufficient to raise an issue
of material fact. Suhadolnik, 151 Idaho at 115,254 P.3d at 16. Contrary to the Eldridges'
argmnent that PA Turpin was given an improper inference under Rule 56, neither party is
entitled to any inferences with regard to the admissibility of evidence; such an inference applies
only when determining if a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus

Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163, 45 P.3d 816,819 (2002).
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When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court it considers
whether the trial court: "(I) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within
the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to
the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason."
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life Co., No. 45200, 2018 WL 3150964, at *9 (Idaho June 28, 2018).

"[A] court is not required to state such standard expressly if the record clearly shows that the
cmni correctly perceived the issue." Id. "[A]dmissibility of expe1i testimony will not be
overturned absent an abuse of that discretion." Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Serv., 143 Idaho 834,
837, 153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007).
The district court recognized its discretion to admit or exclude PA Turpin's affidavit, and
acted within that discretion. R., p. 302. Critically, it also acted consistently with legal precedent
and reached its decision by the exercise of reason. First, there can be no doubt that PA Turpin's
affidavit set fmih sufficient facts, "employing a measure of common sense," to determine that he
was familiar with the standard of care applicable to a physician assistant practicing in Idaho
Falls, Idaho, at the time he cared for Mr. Eldridge. PA Turpin affirmed that he had practiced in
the relevant community and specialty for 11 years. R., pp. 130-31. Utilizing the mandate from
Mattox to apply common sense, the district court determined that working in the area for such a

length of time was sufficient to show that PA Turpin had knowledge of the applicable standard
of care. R., pp. 310-11, 473-76. The case of Samples v. Hanson, 161 Idaho 179, 384 P.3d 943
(2016), fully suppmis this finding. This Court held in that case "there can be no doubt" that
Dr. Birkenhagen's practice in the community for approximately two years and review of the

plaintiffs records was sufficient to provide foundation for knowledge of the previous standard of
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care. Id., 161 Idaho at 185,384 P.3d at 949. Here, PA Turpin practiced in the area for far longer
than Dr. Birkenhagen, and reviewed not only Mr. Eldridge's records, but those of many other
patients in 11 years of practice. As such, there can be no doubt he was familiar with the standard
of care.
Second, the district comi did not abuse its discretion in holding that a physician
assistant's general reference to the care he had provided as defining the relevant standard of care
was not conclusory. The district court properly considered all the cases cited by the patiies,
determining that the controlling precedent was Foster in determining that the affidavit was
admissible. R., pp. 309-11. Not only is the precedent controlling, but the case is factually
similar, as in both cases, the moving patiy was the defendant, while the nonmoving party bore
the burden of proof. In both cases, the care provided was a matter of record, and the defendant's
only burden on summary judgment was to show that the plaintiff could not meet his burden of
proof. In Foster, the Court held that the affidavit provided by the defendant-provider was
sufficient to meet that burden, even though the affidavit "asse1ied the treatment provided to
Foster complied with the applicable standard of care without setting forth the specifics of that
standard or how it was followed." Foster, 141 Idaho at 893, 120 P.3d at 281. PA Turpin's
affidavit similarly asserted that the treatment complied with the standard of care, allowing the
care provided to define the standard of care, rather than spell out every applicable standard.
Thus, under Foster, the affidavit was admissible and sufficient to shift the burden of proof to
plaintiffs. Accordingly, the district comi did not abuse its discretion in admitting PA Turpin's
affidavit.
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3.

The district court's decision granting PA Turpin summary judgment was
appropriate because the Eldridges' expert was not familiar with the standard
of care applicable to PA Turpin.

Notwithstanding the district comi's decision to admit PA Turpin's affidavit, the decision
to grant him summary judgment was appropriate because the Eldridges failed to retain an expert
who was familiar with the standard of care applicable to PA Turpin.
On summary judgment, the moving party is not required to produce any affidavits in
suppo1i of its motion. At the time of the district court's consideration of PA Turpin's motion for
summary judgment in 2015, Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provided that
summary judgment "shall be rendered f01ihwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c) (2015)
(emphasis added). "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
norunoving pmiy's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." (citations omitted/

Foster, 141 Idaho at 893, 120 PJd at 281. Here, PA Turpin showed that the Eldridges could not
establish their medical malpractice claim, arguing that the Eldridges could not prove by direct
expert testimony that he breached the relevant standard of care as required by Section 6-1012, or
that such breach caused Mr. Eldridge's damages. R., pp. 117-18, 122-24, 274-86. PA Turpin
did not have the burden of proof on whether he breached the standard of care, even though he
submitted an affidavit to that effect. Instead, "[Plaintiff! needed to demonstrate a breach of the
2

Rule 56(c)(l)(B) now clarifies that "[a] pmiy asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
disputed must supp011 the assertion by: (A) citing to pmiicular parts of materials in the record ...
or (B) showing ... that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the
fact." PA Turpin submits that under either rule, it was appropriate for the district comi to grant
him summary judgment because the Eldridges' expe11, Dr. Giordani, could not show that he was
familiar with the standard of care for an Idaho Falls physician assistant.
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standard of care as an essential element of his medical negligence claim." Foster, 141 Idaho at
893, 120 P.3d at 281. PA Turpin's only burden of proof was to show that Mr. Eldridge could not
prove an essential element of his case-a breach of the standard of care; he did not have to sltow

wit at the standard of care was or tit at it was not violated. Instead, the motion for summary
judgment hinged solely on whether Mr. Eldridge could produce expe1i testimony sufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact that PA Turpin had breached the local standard of care.

Foster, 141 Idaho at 893, 120 PJd at 281 (holding that the moving party need only produce
"evidence," not specific facts, to shift the burden to the plaintiff to provide "specific facts" in
suppo1i of summary judgment). The Eldridges' failure to produce admissible evidence with
regard to whether PA Turpin breached the standard of care (because Dr. Giordani did not know
the standard of care for a physician assistant) was fatal to his claims. R., p. 486.
Again, the decision granting sunnnary judgment to PA Turpin has not been challenged or
suppmied by argument in this appeal. It, therefore, has been waived. Wheeler, 147 Idaho at 266,
207 P.3d at 997. Accordingly, the district court's decision to grant PA Turpin's summary
judgment motion must be affirmed.

C.

The District Court's Decision to Admit Dr. West's First Affidavit Is Moot; Even if It
Is Not Moot, It Was Not an Abuse of Discretion to Admit It.

1.

The decision to admit Dr. West's first affidavit is moot because his first and
second motions for summary judgment were denied.

The Eldridges have challenged only the sufficiency of Dr. West's first affidavit filed in
support of Defendants' First and Second Motions for Summary Judgment. Appellant's Br.
at 15, referencing R., pp. 135-36. However, Dr. West's first affidavit was not the basis for a
ruling adverse to the Eldridges. Instead, Dr. West's first and second motions for summary
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judgment, which were supported with his first affidavit, were denied. R., pp. 486, 488. As such,
any appellate review is moot or purely advisory because the issue as to the admissibility of
Dr. West's first affidavit will have no effect as to the outcome of this appeal. Again, this Court
does not provide advisory opinions. Barclay, 149 Idaho at 9,232 P.3d at 330.

2.

Even if the district court's decision admitting Dr. West's first affidavit is not
moot, it was an appropriate exercise of discretion.

The district court recognized its discretion to admit or exclude Dr. West's first affidavit
and acted within that discretion. R., p. 302. Critically, it also acted consistent with legal
precedent and reached its decision by the exercise of reason. First, there can be no doubt that
Dr. West's affidavit set fmih sufficient facts, "employing a measure of common sense," to
detennine that he was familiar with the standard of care applicable to an orthopedic physician
practicing in Idaho Falls, Idaho, at the time he cared for Mr. Eldridge, and his practice in Idaho
Falls for nearly 20 years. R., pp. 130-31, 135. The district comi correctly determined that under

Mattox' s mandate to apply common sense, working in the area for such a length of time was
sufficient to show knowledge of the applicable standard of care. R., pp. 310-11, 473-76.
Moreover, Samples supports the district court's finding. Here, Dr. West practiced in the area for
far longer than Dr. Birkenhagen, and reviewed not only Mr. Eldridge's records, but those of
many other patients in his 20 years of practice. As such, there can be no doubt Dr. West was
familiar with the standard of care.
Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that a defendantphysician's general reference to the care he had provided as defining the relevant standard of
care was not conclusory. The district court properly considered all the cases cited by the pmiies,
determining that the controlling precedent was Foster in determining that Dr. West's first
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affidavit was admissible. R., pp. 309-11. Like the defendant physician's affidavits in Foster,
Dr. West's first affidavit similarly asse1ied that the treatment complied with the standard of care,

allowing the care provided to define the standard of care, rather than spell out every applicable
standard. Thus, under Foster, Dr. West's affidavit was admissible. Accordingly, the district
comi's decision to admit Dr. West's affidavit was not an abuse of discretion and it should be
affirmed.
D.

Foster's Common Sense Approach Should Not Be Overruled.
The Eldridges urge that Foster should be overruled, and that the following statement in

footnote I in Mattox should govern:
We note, however, that it is not unusual for a defendant in a
medical malpractice case to suppo1i a motion for sunnnary
judgment with an affidavit stating in very general, conclusory
terms that the defendant complied with the applicable standard of
care. We leave for another day the question of whether such an
affidavit is admissible evidence and sufficient to shift the burden of
production to the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case. We do,
however, observe that whether an affidavit is submitted in support
of, or in opposition to, a motion for summary judgment, it must
contain admissible evidence. In a malpractice case that would
include at a minimum the identification of the standard(s) of care
at issue in the case.
Mattox, 157 Idaho at 472, 337 P.3d at 631. Mattox does not recognize that this Court in Foster
already addressed the issue.
In Foster, the plaintiff argued that defendants' affidavits in support of summary
judgment, "were 'fact-deficient' and conclusory because the affidavits asserted the treatment
provided to Foster complied with the applicable standard of care without setting forth the
specifics of that standard or how it was followed." Id The Court upheld the use of these
affidavits, noting that there is a different evidentiary standard for a moving party and nonmoving
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party. The moving party must present "evidence," that there is no dispute of material fact, but
the nonmoving patty must counter with "specific facts" showing a dispute. Id. "Consequently,
when the Defendants made a showing they had complied with the standard of care, they shifted
the burden and placed in question an essential element of Foster's case." Id.
The Foster decision is in line with Idaho Code Sections 6-1012 and 6-1013, which place
the burden of producing expe1t medical testimony on the applicable standard of cm·e squarely on
the plaintiff:
The plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must demonstrate by
the use of expert medical testimony that the defendant negligently
failed to meet the applicable standard of health care as it existed at
the time and place of the alleged negligence. Dulaney v.
St. Alphonsus, 137 Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002). Here,
Foster needed to demonstrate a breach of the standard of care as an
essential element of his medical negligence claim. Dunlap By and
Through Dunlap v. Garner, 127 Idaho 599, 604, 903 P.2d 1296,
1301 (1994). "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an
essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily
renders all other facts immaterial." McGilvray v. Farmers New
World Life ins. Co., 136 Idaho 39, 42, 28 P.3d 380,383 (2001)
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,323, 106 S.Ct.
2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265,273 (1986)).
Foster, 141 Idaho at 893, 120 P.3d at 281. Requiring defendant doctors and other medical

professionals to come forward on summary judgment with their own detailed versions of the
standard of care is contrary to Sections 6-1012 and 6-1013. Accordingly, there is no basis to
ovell'ule Foster with the footnote in Mattox. Doing so would be contrary to Sections 6-1012 and
6-1013.
Moreover, the standard that the Eldridges wish to impose would only serve to promote
form over function, and waste judicial resources. Critically, the Eldridges have not alleged that
they were prejudiced in any way by the form of the affidavits. They have not alleged that they
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were unable to identify the care to which Dr. West and PA Turpin referred, which was based on
the allegations of the Eldridges' own complaint, or identify the standard of care. The standard of
care was precisely identified down to the specific circumstances and clinical findings by
reference to the care actually provided. The Eldridges' own expert was able to identify specific
ways in which he felt that the care fell below the standard of care, which testimony was used to
oppose summary judgment. R., pp. 158-69; R., pp. 173-74; R., pp. 180-85.
While the affidavits do not expressly catalog each and every item of care provided in the
two year period, there can be no doubt as to what care is referenced. The care provided is
documented in the medical records and available for all parties as a reference. The detailed
Amended Verified Complaint clearly illustrates that the Eldridges were familiar with that care.
R., pp. 354-70. Accordingly, only the slightest inductive reasoning is required to "identify the
standard of care" and how defendants complied with it. Both affidavits affirm that the care
provided met the standard of care-thus, the care provided identifies the standard of care.

It would have been nearly impossible for Dr. West and PA Turpin to have specifically
identified every possible instance of malpractice over the course of two years, and then spell out
the applicable standard of care and how it was followed. Furthermore, not only was
Mr. Eldridge privy to all the care provided, but the care provided by Dr. West and PA Turpin in
that time period was contained in Mr. Eldridge's medical records, which the Eldridges had in
their possession.
Even ifit were technically possible for Dr. West and PA Turpin to identify each and
every item of care provided or decision made, state the specific standard of care, and include
each individually in their affidavit, there is no need. The affidavits provided are sufficient to put
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the Eldridges on notice of the West defendants' defenses without requiring the submission of
lengthy affidavits or hundreds (or even thousands) of pages of medical records in order to refute
such overbroad allegations by the Eldridges. Both of those options would consume valuable
time and resources of the district court and all counsel, particularly when the sole purpose is to
put the district court and the Plaintiffs on notice that Dr. West and PA Turpin can and will testify
that none of the care provided breached the standard of care. Accordingly, there is no basis to
overrule Foster.
E.

The District Court Properly Granted Partial Summary Judgment to Dr·. West As to
Damages the Eldridges Claim to Have Incurred for Medical Care After April 24,
2013.
1.

Summary judgment must be affirmed because the district court's
determination that Dr. Giordani's opinions were not properly disclosed
under I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) has not been appealed or shown to be in error.

The Eldridges have not provided any argument on appeal that the district court e1Ted in
concluding that Dr. Giordani's expert opinion disclosures failed to comply with Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(4). Tr., 169:6-9. Issues raised for the first time on appeal or not supported
by argument are waived and will not be considered by the Court. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc.
v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 93, 803 P.2d 993 (1991) ("[W]e will not review the actions of
a trial court, unless the action has been listed as an issue on appeal, especially where no
authorities are cited and no argument is contained in the appellate briefs."); Wheeler, 147 Idaho
at 266, 207 P.3d at 997 ("This Cout1 has held that issues on appeal that are not supported by
propositions oflaw or authority are deemed waived and will not be considered."); Houston v.
Whittier, 147 Idaho 900,911,216 P.3d 1272, 1283 (2009) ("This Court will not consider issues
raised for the first time on appeal, .... ").
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Additionally, the Court should affirm the trial court's exclusion of Dr. Giordani's
testimony on damages after April 24, 2013, based on his failure to disclose the "basis and
reasons for the opinion" and "the data or other information considered by the witness in forming
the opinions" as required by Rule 26(b )(4). The Eldridges were required to make these
disclosures by May 31, 2016. While disclosures were filed, Dr. Giordani's repmt was the same
that was filed in June 2015, and did not include any mention of any treatment after April 24,
2013. R., p. 709. It did not discuss any medical records after April 24, 2013. Fmther, the report
did not include any opinion regarding treatment of MRSA, rather than the acquisition of MRSA.
R.,pp. 710-11.
While Dr. Giordani's May 23, 2016, declaration recited that he had reviewed the medical
records attached to Dr. West's Second Affidavit and those attached to his own declaration, none
of those records included any after April 2013. R. Supp., pp. 76-138; Aug., pp. 1-115. Simply
put, nothing in the Eldridges' expert disclosures demonstrated that Dr. Giordani had any
knowledge of the "subsequent surgeries" that Mr. Eldridge underwent or the reasons for those
surgeries that occurred after April 24, 2013. None of Dr. Giordani's declarations, affidavits,
depositions or reports identify any records or scientific principles that support his opinions.
None of them identify any records or other items that will be used as an exhibit in suppmt of his
opinions regarding any surgeries. None of them refer specifically to any procedure. None of
them mention a single characteristic of later surgeries that shows it was caused by the delayed
explant. In short, the district comt properly excluded any opinion that damages incurred after
April 24, 2013, were caused or related to Dr. West's care and that opinion should be affirmed.
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2.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Giordani's
vague, conclusory opinions that had no factual or medical foundation to
support the Eldridges' claim for damages related to the costs of healthcare
after April 24, 2013.

Before discussing the issue of causation, it is important to clarify that the district court's
decision was not based on Dr. Giordani's lack of expertise, nor did it concern the standard of
care. The district court held that Dr. Giordani did have a weak foundation regarding the standard
of care and how to treat MRSA. R., p. 596, Tr., 168:13-20. Because the district court did not
dispute that Dr. Giordani was an expert, and because the issue here is causation, not the standard
of care, the Eldridges' extensive discussion of Samples is not relevant. Appellants' Br. at 27-31.
The district court did not dispute that Dr. Giordani was an expe1i, but it held that without
reviewing the records related to Mr. Eldridge's treatment after April 24, 2013, Dr. Giordani had
no foundation to offer an opinion that treatment Mr. Eldridge received after April 24, 2013, was
related to Dr. West's decision not to explant the first hip in December 2012. Tr., 168:21 169:25. Without that foundation Dr. Giordani's opinion is no more than conclusory, speculation
and inadmissible. Rule 702 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence does not allow speculative opinions.
Accordingly, the district court's decision on the admissibility of Dr. Giordani's testimony was
straightforward and clearly within the bounds of its discretion.
In Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 45,844 P.2d 24, 27 (Ct. App. 1992), it was stated:
[U]nder Rule 702 qualified expe1is may testify in the form of an
opinion only if their specialized lmowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.
Because a verdict cannot rest on speculation or conjecture,
Petersen v. Pany, 92 Idaho 647,652, 448 P.2d 653,658 (1968),
expe1i opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated
by facts in the record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its
verdict, and therefore is inadmissible as evidence under Rule 702.
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Testimony is speculative when it "theorizes about a matter as to which evidence is not sufficient
for certain knowledge." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 565, 97 P.3d 428,432 (2004).
"In determining whether expert testimony is admissible, a court must evaluate the
expert's ability to explain pertinent scientific principles and to apply those principles to the
formulation of his or her opinion. Admissibility, therefore, depends on the validity of the
expert's reasoning and methodology, rather than his or her ultimate conclusion.... " Coombs v.
Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140-41, 219 P.3d 453, 464-65 (2009) (internal citation omitted). The

court "must distinguish scientifically sound reasoning from that of the self-validating expert,
who uses scientific terminology to present unsubstantiated personal beliefs .... " Id. at 140-41,
219 P.3d at 464-65. Where an expert's reasoning or methodology is not scientifically sound or
not "based upon a 'reasonable degree of medical probability"' and a mere possibility, such
testimony will not assist the trier of fact. Cf Blocking v. Albertson's, Inc., 129 Idaho 844, 84647, 934 P.2d 17, 19-20 (1997) (quoting Roberts v. Kit Mfg. Co., 124 Idaho 946,948,866 P.2d
969,971 (1993)).
a)

The district court did not abuse its discretion by holding that
Dr. Giordani had to have some knowledge of subsequent surgeries or
healthcare Mr. Eldridge had after April 24, 2013, in order to testify
they were caused by Dr. West's care of Mr. Eldridge after he was
diagnosed with MRSA on December 20, 2012.

The specific issue the Eldridges had to prove on their only remaining claim was whether
Dr. West's use of conservative treatment for the MRSA infection from December 20, 2012,
through March 13, 2013, rather than an immediate explant of the hip, caused all of
Mr. Eldridge's medical care after April 24, 2013, and the need for a potential implantation of a
new hip. The entirety of Dr. Giordani's opinion stated: "Had Dr. West performed the full
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explant when he found that Mr. Eldridge had MRSA, it is more probable than not that
Mr. Eldridge would not have needed the subsequent surgeries and then potential re-implantation
of a new hip." R., p. 596; Aug., pp. 15-16, ~ 32. This opinion was not included in
Dr. Giordani's report that was filed on June 10, 2015, as part of the Eldridges' opposition to
Dr. West's Second Motion for Summary Judgment,3 his expert disclosures, which were first
served on September 30, 2015, or his supplemental disclosure on May 31, 2016. R., pp. 180,
197-204. It was not disclosed prior to his deposition on Februaiy I 0, 2016. The first and only
mention was in the May 23, 2016, declaration. The opinion cited no records, studies, evidence
or anything else in suppmi.
The trial comi did not abuse its discretion in excluding this opinion. There is no evidence
that Dr. Giordani reviewed any records after April 24, 2013, when forming this opinion. As
noted above, his report did not address any care after April 24, 2013, in any way. While the
Eldridges now assert that Dr. Giordani did review records from the University of Utah, South
Davis Hospital, and Dr. Altenberg (Appellant's Br. at 23 referencing R., pp. 181,329, 704),
those records are undated. As such, it is impossible for the Court to identify what records were
reviewed. More impo1iantly, for purposes of determining whether the district court abused its
discretion, the Eldridges never asserted to the district court that Dr. Giordani had reviewed later
records. R., pp. 940-58. Instead, they conceded that Dr. Giordani did not review any medical
records after April 24, 2013, but asse1i that his lack of knowledge regarding later treatment does
not prevent him from testifying that such unknown treatment was caused by the delayed explant:

3

The list of records that Dr. Giordani reviewed was included in his repmi, submitted on
June 10,2015.
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THE COURT: I have the same question, similarly, that I asked
Mr. Williams. Where in the record does it say that Dr. Giordani
saw any medical records for Mr. Eldridge after April 24, 2013?
MR. JAVIER GAB IOLA: I don't know tit at, Your honor,
because I - I didn't see tit at anywhere.
THE COURT: Well, if Dr. Giordani hasn't looked.at any medical
records in 2014, 2015, and 2016, how can he possibly say that
none of those surgeries would have been necessary?
MR. JAVIER GABIOLA: Well, Your Honor, again it gets back to
what I'm looking at or how I'm looking at this; and it's as simple
as this: I don't know tlwt it's necessarily required that
Dr. Giordani look at those records . ...
Tr., 162:23 -163:10 (emphasis added).
The district court properly held that testimony that Dr. West's alleged delay in explanting
the hip when Mr. Eldridge had MRSA in December 2012 caused all of Mr. Eldridge's healthcare
after April 24, 2013, requires, at a minimum, some knowledge of that medical care. It is not
sufficient to simply claim that all such surgeries, regardless of their nature, are related. As an
easy example, regardless of when Mr. Eldridge's first hip was explanted, a new hip would need
to be implanted at some point. If that new hip was later subject to a recall and had to be
removed, how can that possibly be related to the MRSA infection? Without reviewing any
medical records after April 24, 2013, to asce1iain the nature of, or the need for, the subsequent
surgeries, Dr. Giordani simply cannot claim that they are all related to Dr. West's use of
conservative treatment prior to the explant of the first hip.
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b)

There is no chain of circumstances that can bolster Dr. Giordani's
conclusory opinions or substitute for expert testimony that the
delayed explant caused all of Mr. Eldridge's medical care after
April 24, 2013.

The Eldridges claim that this case is not complex, and that therefore a jury can simply
determine through a "chain of circumstances" that all future medical care was a result of the
delay in explanting the hip after MRSA was discovered. That is simply not legally or factually
tenable. First, this case is medically complex and causation cannot be established with lay
testimony. This Court has held that a district court should disregard lay opinion testimony
relating to the cause of a medical condition, as a lay witness is not competent to testify to such
matters. Kolin v. St. Luke's Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 329-30, 940 P.2d 1142, 1146-47
(1997); Evans v. Twin Falls Cnty., 118 Idaho 210, 214, 796 P.2d 87, 91 (1990). If this case is
not complex as the Eldridges maintain, then why have they retained Dr. Giordani, a medical
expeti, to give an opinion as to causation?
Second, this is not a case of simply failing to treat a condition that was fully and reliably
curable, as was the case in Sheridan v. St. Luke's Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 135 Idaho 775, 779, 25 P.3d
88, 92 (2001) ("A blood exchange transfusion, which would have resulted in an immediate
reduction in the bilirubin levels, was not performed."), and in Formant v. Kircher, 91 Idaho 290,
296,420 P.2d 661,667 (1965) (staph infection was usually controllable), the case on which

Sheridan relied. Instead it is a question of how an alternative treatment followed by the
treatment advocated by the Eldridges' expeti affected the outcome. Dr. Giordani's testimony is
that the only way to treat MRSA is with an explant, and even then, there is only an "80-90%
chance at best," of eradicating MRSA. R., p. 636, 59: 18-20. He did not testify regarding the
chances of eradication if the circumstances were not "at best," such as where the patient (like Mr.
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Eldridge) was allergic to many antibiotics that would otherwise be used to treat MRSA after an
explant. R. Supp., p. 87. Dr. Giordani has not identified any study, facts, cases or other basis for
a conclusion that conservative treatment negatively impacts the success of MRSA eradication
following an explant. Such a determination is well outside the scope of a lay juror's
understanding, and does not lend itself to "natural inferences" as to its effect.
After considering the Sheridan, Weeks, and Coombs cases cited by the Eldridges, the
district court held that expert testimony was required on the issue of causation because treatment
ofMRSA was outside the scope ofa lay juror's competence. Tr., 167:1-168:13. It is imp01tant
to recognize that the issue here is not simply a question of the chances of curing MRSA with a
full explant versus conservative treatment, but instead the chances of curing MRSA with
conservative treatmentfollowed by an exp/ant. Again, the issue here is causation, not a breach
of the standard of care. The district court held that Dr. Giordani had sufficient, though weak,
foundation for his testimony regarding the standard of care for treating MRSA, but that there was
no foundation for any opinion that care or surgeries subsequent to April 24, 2013, were the result
of Dr. West's care. Tr., 168:14-169:25.
This case is substantially different medically and factually from the "chain of
circumstances" cases relied upon by the Eldridges. Unlike the cases in Sheridan, Weeks and

Coombs, the alleged chain of circumstances here is a very long one-at least five years-and
Dr. Giordani' s faihue to review any of the records related to that chain preclude him from
offering an opinion that the chain was unbroken. In Sheridan, the chain was seven days longbetween bi1th on March 23 and the onset of brain damage from improperly treated jaundice on
March 30. Sheridan, 135 Idaho at 779, 25 P.3d at 92. Further, in Sheridan, there was
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undisputed testimony that had the jaundice been properly identified as abnormal, the high
bilirubin levels could have been successfully and immediately treated by a blood transfusion,
preventing the brain damage that occurred less than a week later. Id., 135 Idaho at 786, 25 P.3d
at 99. The only "chain of circumstances" that the jmy had to find was that earlier identification
by the nurses of abnormal jaundice would have resulted in treatment. Id. The chain was merely
a logical inference, not a medical question.
In contrast, Weeks and Coombs found expert testimony admissible where there was
underlying scientific evidence for causation, although not specific empirical data for the precise
cause of injury. In Weeks, the chain of circumstances was limited to an inference that chemicals
infused into the brain would have contributed to the patient's death, since the expert testified that
studies as to the exact effects were not possible for ethical reasons. The expe1t, however, had
testified that the amount of fluid alone would have been fatal. Weeks, 143 Idaho at 839, 153 P.3d
at 1185. Similarly, in Coombs, plaintiffs' expe1t explained a "chain of circumstances" for his
opinions that the improper use of Propofol caused the fatal cerebral edema in the patient. Id.,
148 Idaho at 143,219 P.3d at 467. The "chain" was "several aiticles establishing connections
between each cause and effect in the chain of events that led to his conclusion. Specifically,
there were studies indicating Propofol was toxic and tended to cause hypotension, which, in turn,
could cause cerebral edema. Thus, like the testimony at issue in Weeks, there was direct
scientific evidence to suppmt Dr. Hammer's opinion." Id. (emphasis added).

Here, there is no such chain of scientific evidence to support Dr. Giordani' s opinion. He
has not stated any opinion on how the delay of explanting the first hip would impact the outcome
of the explant, nor has he pointed to any scientific evidence that would suppmt such an opinion.
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He has not even related any particular procedure to the delay. Instead, Dr. Giordani's opinion is
essentially that all treatment after Dr. West's alleged breach of the standard of care by not
immediately explanting the first hip when MRSA was diagnosed in December 2012, regardless
of its nature, was caused by the breach. This is the kind of "temporal proximity" testimony that
was rejected in Swallow v. Emergency Med of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589,593, 67 P.3d 68, 72
(2003) (rejecting testimony where there was no evidence that Cipro could cause heart attacks).
Here, as discussed above, there is no admissible expert testimony that would allow an expert or a
jury to reasonably and naturally infer (1) that under the circumstances an immediate explant
more probably than not would have completely cured the MRSA, (2) that the treatment with
antibiotics prior to the explant changed the outcome of the MRSA, or (3) that every subsequent
surgery or medical care after April 23, 2014, regardless of its nature or purpose, was caused by
the delay in explanting the first hip. The facts in this case show that once Mr. Eldridge left
Dr. West's care in the spring of 2013, he went to a different doctor, Dr. Altenburg, who
concluded, in October 2013, that the MRSA infection was gone and placed a second hip. There
is no chain of circumstances here. Even so, it was broken when Dr. Altenburg declared

Mr. Eldridge to be free from any infection and put in the second hip. Accordingly, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the Eldridges' damages to medical care in the time
between the diagnosis ofMRSA on December 20, 2012, and April 24, 2013.

F.

The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion by Allowing Ouly the Paid
Amount as Evidence of Eldridge's Medical Expenses.

1.

Only the amount paid for medical care constitutes damages under Idaho law.

Under Idaho law, there is no dispute that only the aruount of medical bills for which a
plaintiff (or his insurer) is liable constitute damages. Both this Court and Judge Shinderling
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recognized this fundamental principle when the issue of how to deal with Medicare write-offs
was first before them. Dyet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526,529, 81 P.3d 1236, 1239 (2003).
The district comt followed a rule adopted by many states with
statutes similar to that ofldaho. Citing Kastick v. U-Haul, 740
N.Y.S.2d 167,292 A.D.2d 797 (2002) and Loncar v. Gray, 28 P.3d
928 (Alaska 2001), the district court stated that "these jurisdictions
hold that while Medicare write-offs are technically not payments
from a collateral source, plaintiffs may not recover the amount of
the write-off from a tmtfeasor because it was not an item of
damages for which the plaintijj ever became obligated."
Id (emphasis added).
In Kastick, "Defendants contend[ed) that plaintiff may not recover from them an amount
for which she never became obligated. We agree with defendants." Kastick v. U-Haul Co. of W
Mich., 740 N.Y.S.2d 167,169,292 A.D.2d 797, 798 (2002). This Comt also agreed with the
defendants in Dyet. After determining that a write-off is not a collateral source, the Court in
Dyet closed its discussion of the issue by quoting Kastick, 740 N.Y.S2d at 169,292 A.D.2d at
798: "As reasoned by the New York court in Kastick, 'Although the write-off teclmically is not
a payment from a collateral source within the meaning of [the collateral source statute], it is not
an item of damages for which plaintiff may recover because plaintiff has incmTed no liability
therefore."' Dyet, 139 Idaho at 1239, 81 P.3d at 529.
Kastick's decision that these damages are not recoverable was based on prior case Jaw in
Pennsylvania, Moorheadv. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786,789 (Pa. 2001), abrogated
on other grounds by Northbrook Life Ins. Co. v. Com., 597 Pa. 18,949 A.2d 333 (2008):
The controlling question in this case is whether the definition of
"reasonable value" permits an injured party to recover from the
tortfeasor damages in an amount greater than the amount that the
plaintiff has actually paid or for which he or she has incurred
liability. We find that the amount paid and accepted by Appellee

- 33 07823.0003.11254876.I

as payment in full for the medical services is the amount Appellant
is entitled to recover as compensatory damages. "The expenses for
which a plaintiff may recover must be such as have been actually
paid, or such as, in the judgment of the jury, are reasonably
necessary to be incurred."
(Citations omitted.)
The Idaho Legislature has adopted this same approach to economic damages. Idaho
Code Section 6-1601(3) only allows recovery for actual monetary losses: '"Economic damages'
means objectively verifiable monetary loss, including, but not limited to, out-of-pocket expenses,
loss of earnings, loss of use of prope1ty, cost of replacement or repair, cost of obtaining
substitute domestic services, loss of employment, medical expenses, or loss of business or
employment oppmtunities." (Emphasis added.) The California Supreme Cou1t succinctly
explained this concept in Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130, 1133
(Cal. 2011):
The collateral source rule, which precludes deduction of
compensation the plaintiff has received from sources independent
of the tortfeasor from damages the plaintiff "would othe1wise
collect from the tmtfeasor", ensures that plaintiff here may recover
in damages the amounts her insurer paid for her medical care. Tlte
rule, however, ltas no bearing 011 amounts that were included in
a provider's bill but/or which tlte plaintiff never incurre,1
liability because tlte provider, by prior agreement, accepted a
lesser amount as full payment. Such sums are not damages the
plaintiff would otlterwise It ave collected from the defendant.
They are neither paid to tlte providers 011 the plaintiff's behalf
nor paid to the plaintiff in indemnity of/tis or lter expenses.
Because they do not represent mt economic loss for tlte plaintiff,
they are not recoverable in tlte first instance.
(Emphasis added.) See also CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3281 (damages are awarded to compensate for
detriment suffered), 3282 (detriment is a loss or harm to person or property). The billed
amount-which is not due or owing-is not a monetary loss. Thus, the only relevant evidence is
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evidence that will establish the amount of compensation due for the loss actually sustained, i.e.,
the amount actually paid for medical care. See I.R.E. 401,402. The jury's task is to determine
"the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate the plaintiff for any damages
proved to be proximately caused by the defendant's negligence." IDJI 9.01 (emphasis added).
However, a plaintiff cannot be "compensated" for damages that were never incurred.
Although the Court in Dyer began its discussion of the issue with Section 6-1606, its
conclusion was based on the fact that the write-off was not an item of damages for which a
plaintiff could recover, and by applying the post-trial write-off, plaintiff did not recover
inappropriate damages. Write-offs were not a collateral source under the common law, and they
are not a collateral source under Idaho Code Section 6-1606. They are not an item of damages
under Idaho Code Section 6-1601(3). No additional legislative action was necessary to deal with
write-offs because unpaid amounts are not "monetary loss" and thus simply are not an item of
damages. The statute is irrelevant to the discussion. Instead, the operative principle in Dye/ and
Idaho Code Section 6-1601 (3) is that the write-off is simply not damages.

2.

The district court's decision to admit only the paid amount of the bills is
consistent with this Court's decision in Dyet.

Like the Dye/ Court, the district judge in this case, Judge St. Clair, recognized that the
recoverable damages are the amount paid and that mention of insurance should be avoided:
[T]he only real relevant evidence is the amount actually paid for
the medical expense rather than the amount that's never paid, so
we need to determine -- the jury needs to determine what the actual
damages suffered by the Eldridges was; and their damages are
what was actually paid. ....
So I'm going to grant tl,e motion and order tl,at either the full
amount be redacted so that only the paid amount shows up or use
a Rule 1006 approacl, where there's a summary and the
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summary would go and the actual bills themselves would not
have to go to the jury. So that'll be my ruling on that particular
motion.
Tr., 178:12-179:13 (emphasis added).
Further, Dyet did not hold that a trial court must allow the full billed amount to be
presented to the jury, and later adjust the verdict by the amount of the write-off. In Dyet, the
Comt held that Judge Shinderling did not err by excluding the paid amounts because his decision

(1) did not implicate insurance, and (2) ultimately did not award improper damages. Although
Judge St. Clair's decision admits the paid amounts, he accomplished these same goals of not
implicating insurance and not awarding improper damages, just more directly. Impo1tantly,
Judge St. Clair exercised his discretion in admitting the paid amounts in order to prevent a
situation when it would be impossible to avoid awarding improper damages in a situation where
the jmy awards only a portion of the billed amount:
So if you present the full amount of all the bills and the jmy comes
out with a lump sum dollar amount, it's virtually impossible in a
post-trial hearing to determine which bills were awarded in order
to then offset or reduce certain bills by the Medicare write-down.
If a hundred percent of the bills are awarded, then it's not that
tough to do. But where they come up with a figure, there's no real
way oflmowing which ones were included and which weren't; and
that makes a - the procedure used in Dye/ and Slack virtually
impossible to do post-trial.
Tr., 178: 12 - 179: 13. Judge St. Clair properly recognized that ifless than the full amount of
medical care was awarded, he would be unable to properly adjust the judgment post-verdict.
Thus, his use of discretion was appropriate and consistent with Dyet.
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3.

The district court's decision is consistent with Idaho's public policy.

Judge St. Clair's approach is consistent with Idaho's public policy and avoids post-trial
difficulties, promotes judicial efficiency, and avoids unfair prejudice to the defendants. First, as
Judge St. Clair recognized, by only admitting the paid amounts, he avoided the possibility that
the jury would improperly award a windfall. Dye/ is clear that such a windfall is against public
policy. The Eldridges do not dispute that only the paid amount is ultimately recoverable by a
plaintiff. If the district court is unable to identify the proper post-trial adjustment because Jess
than the full billed amount is awarded, plaintiffs may be awarded damages for more or less than
the jury intended to compensate. This is not an issue if the paid amounts are presented to the
jury.
Second, admitting the paid amounts as evidence is judicially efficient; it requires no
greater effort on the part of litigants, and less effort for the district court. Regardless of whether
the billed or paid amount of the medical bills are admitted, almost every bill includes some
reference to insurance that will require redacting. As such, nothing is saved by admitting the
billed rather than the paid amounts. More importantly, in cases like this one, with over
$1 million in billed costs, the medical expenses are almost always presented in a summary as
allowed by Idaho Rule of Evidence 1006. Such a summary can easily include the paid amount,
which is the same as the allowed damages, avoiding the need for a post-verdict reduction, as well
as avoiding the reference to insurance.
Third, admitting the paid amount avoids the prejudice to defendants that the Eldridges
argue is caused by admitting the full billed amounts. The Eldridges argue that it is necessary to
admit the full billed amount because it increases the amount of general damages awarded to
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plaintiffs. In other words, by misleading the jury with regard to the amount of medical expenses
plaintiffs incuned, the jury will award an inflated amount of general damages. While the writeoff is subtracted from the judgment post-verdict, there is no similar procedure to conect the
inflated general damages award. Not only is this prejudicial, but artificially inflating the general
damages is contrary to the consistent purpose of the tmi reform legislation. As noted previously,
the Medical Malpractice Act was to limit recovery in order to stabilize the insurance market.
Chapter 16 of Title 6 similarly imposed limits on noneconomic damages and punitive damages,
except in specific cases, and bars a double recovery for collateral source payments. It is against
the public policy of the state ofldaho to contravene these enactments by aiiificially inflating
damages by using the billed amounts at trial.
The Eldridges' argument that the billed amount somehow better reflects the general
damages does not stand scrutiny. The Eldridges have shown no real correlation between the
amount billed and the seriousness of the injury. A broken bone may be more serious than a torn
muscle, but is cheaply diagnosed with an x-ray, rather than a more expensive MRI. A broken
bone treated at an urgent care may be no more debilitating than one treated at the ER afterhours
for ten times the price. Casting the same broken bone in 2018 likely cost significantly more than
in 1918, but is probably much less serious due to advances in technology and pain management.
Even if there were some connection between the cost of medical care and the seriousness of the
injury, Plaintiffs have numerous other means of demonstrating the pain and suffering that they
have incurred as a result of their injury. They can testify regarding the number of appointments,
the time in the hospital, the inconvenience, pain, impairment, lost oppmiunities, limited
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enjoyment of life, etc. There is simply no need to mislead the jury by producing inflated medical
bills that were not actually incurred.
The Eldridges argue that Dyet 's approach provides equal protection under the law
because it treats people without insurance and people with insurance, whether private or through
the government, the same. However, allowing the paid amount of medical bills treats people the
same-they are allowed to claim the full amount of their loss. Whether the loss is $1,000 or
$10,000, each will be made whole. If the amount paid differs with a person who has no health
insurance than one who does, then it is not unreasonable or a violation of equal protection to
award a different amount because the amount of their damages is different. Allowing only the
paid amount does not punish people with insurance and reward those without insurance. It
reflects an accurate picture of a plaintiffs tiue damage for medical care.
Accordingly, the district court's decision allowing only the paid amount was not an abuse
of discretion, or inconsistent with Dye/. It, therefore, should be affitmed.

G.

The West Defendants Are Entitled to Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal, Not the
Eldridges.
Under Rule 40 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, costs are awarded to the prevailing party.

Attorney fees are available on appeal under Idaho Code Section 12-121 and Rule 41 of the Idaho
Appellate Rules if the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation. Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549,559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006). The Eldridges
are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal, as Dr. West, PA Turpin and Summit have not
defended their action frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. The district court granted
Dr. West and Summit partial summary judgment, and PA Turpin summary judgment, which, in
and of itself, renders their defenses reasonable and with foundation. There is no basis for this
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Court to reverse the district court's decisions granting partial summary judgment to Dr. West and
Summit and summary judgment to PA Turpin. There is no basis to reverse the district court as to
the billed versus paid issue. Instead, the appeal is frivolous, as the Eldridges have advanced
claims that are moot, were not challenged at the district court level, and are contrary to their own
asse1tions. Accordingly, Dr. West, PA Turpin, and Summit are entitled to attorney fees under
Idaho Code Section 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 and costs under I.A.R. 40.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Dr. West, PA Turpin, and Sununit respectfully request that the
Comt affirm the district comt's decisions and grant them attorney fees and costs on appeal.
.,2 ~.,.

DATED THIS ~/ _....dayofJuly,2018.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

By ~ f . ~
Julian E. Gabiola, ISB No. 5455
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents

- 40 07823.0003.11254876. I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

sr

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this if_ 'cfa y of July, 2018, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENTS' BRIEF by the method indicated below, and addressed
to each of the following:
Reed W. Larsen
Javier L. Gabiola
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants

D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
i:rt-mail
reed@cooper-larsen.com
javier@cooper-larsen.com
D Facsimile - 208.235.1182

Julian E. Gabiola

- 41 07823.0003. 11 254876. I

